Abstract-A biometric replay attack occurs when a victim's biometric information (in the form of a template) is stolen by a hacker as it is transmitted over a network and used by the hacker to impersonate the victim to gain unauthorized access. Biometric replay attacks can be particularly devastating because the victims of these attacks cannot easily alter their biometrics or the templates associated with their biometrics [1].
INTRODUCTION
Biometrics is becoming the preferred method of identification for authentication systems as opposed to tokenbased and knowledge-based methods [3, 4] . Token-based methods are techniques that use items such as smartcards or a driver's license as tokens to allow access [5, 6] , Knowledgebased methods use information (knowledge) in the form of passwords or security question responses [7, 8] . A disadvantage of token-based methods is that tokens can be easily stolen and used maliciously [9, 10] . Knowledge-based methods also have a number of disadvantages as passwords/answers can easily be guessed, forgotten and/or stolen [11, 12] .
Biometric Authentication Systems (BAS) focus on the physical traits of individuals to determine whether authentication should be granted [13, 14] . Some examples of physical traits include the iris [15, 16] , fingerprint [17, 18] or face [19, 20] . By looking at physical traits, this form of authentication avoids the disadvantages of token-based and knowledge-based methods in that physical traits cannot be forgotten nor can they be easily stolen [21] .
Although BASs have clear advantages over systems using the aforementioned methods, they are still vulnerable to attack, particularly a replay attack [22] . Replay attacks occur when a user's information, used for authentication in a BAS, is captured while being sent along a network and used at a later time by a hacker to fraudulently gain access [23] . The consequences of a replay attack are not only the unwanted intrusion of an attacker into a system but, if the privacy of members using the system is important, the victim's identification is also put at risk of being exposed.
There exists a number of counter measures for preventing replay attacks on a BAS. One way is to use multiple sensors, which reads in different physical traits of an individual [24, 25] . This increases the difficulty of a replay attack in that multiple templates must be captured and replayed as opposed to just one. This method however comes with an increased computational complexity to the system, in that multiple templates must be matched [26] . Another form of protection is multi-factor authentication, which is to use knowledge-based and token-based methods in combination with biometrics [27] . In this case, a user must provide a biometric as well as information and/or a token. This method is more secure than biometrics alone, but the knowledge-based and token-based methods still have the same disadvantages discussed previously.
In [2] , Shelton et al. developed a Genetic and Evolutionary Biometric Security (GEBS) method that used disposable feature extractors (FEs). Unlike a traditional BAS which uses a deterministic FE, this GEBS method uses a different FE after any access attempt. Results from [2] show that different FEs create unique templates, also referred to as feature vectors (FV), for the same image. If a replay attack were to occur, FVs resulting from different FEs would have a similarity distance that suggests a replay attack is occurring. The FEs were created using the GEFE ML (Genetic and Evolutionary Feature Extraction -Machine Learning) technique [28] .
In this paper, we extend the research of [2] in an effort to develop permutation-based Biometric Authentication Protocols. The purpose of this work is to be able to create a greater number of unique FVs than the original disposable FEs approach. This reduces the chances of a captured template being successfully matched with an enrolled template.
The remainder of this paper is as follows. Section II provides an overview of LBP [29] , GEFE ML and Protocols I and II for disposable FEs. Section III presents Protocols III and IV. Section IV presents our experiments, Section V presents our results, and Section VI presents a discussion of the results. Finally, Section VII presents our conclusions and future work.
II. BACKGROUND A. Local Binary Pattern Algorithm
Feature extraction is used to convert an image into a template. The Local Binary Pattern (LBP) algorithm [30] is a feature extraction technique that segments an image into regions, also referred to as patches, and looks at the pixel intensity values within a patch [31] . For each pixel in a patch that is surrounded on all sides by other pixels in the same patch, a pattern can be produced. This pattern is produced by comparing the pixel intensity values of pixels some user specified distance away from each other. From each patch, a histogram is created that contains the frequencies of patterns within a region. The histograms from all regions are concatenated together to form a FV for an image.
The distance measure used in this research to compare FVs is the Manhattan distance measure (1). Equation 1 compares corresponding features between two FVs, f i and f j . The variable k is the current position being compared, and l is the length of the FV.
(1)
B. Genetic and Evolutionary Feature Extraction -Machine Learning
GEFE ML is a Genetic and Evolutionary Computation [29] that searches for FEs that have high recognition accuracies, low usage of features, and generalizes well to unseen images [28] . Unlike the traditional LBP approach, which uses nonoverlapping, uniform patches that extract from the entire image, GEFE ML evolves FEs with overlapping patches that only extracts from a subset of an image. FEs are represented as a set of patches; each patch is given a location on an image and its dimensions. Each FE could create between 1 to n patches; by penalizing a FE with a large number of patches GEFE ML reduces the number features in a FV. During the training process, cross validation technique is used to record the FE that generalizes well during the training process [28] .
C. Biometric Authentication System
Within a BAS, there is a sensor that takes an image of a physical trait of the user seeking access, and some form of feature extraction occurs on the trait's image to convert it into a FV for that user. There is also a database of previously enrolled FVs of users that should be granted access into a BAS. The FV read in from the sensor is passed across a network and matched with the enrolled FV from the database that belongs to the user currently seeking access. The matching process determines if the two FVs are similar enough to allow access to the user.
D. Protocols I and II
For access to be granted according to Protocol I, FEs and corresponding FVs must be matching. In a biometric system employing disposable FEs, a sensor captures a user's biometric sample on the client side. A FE will be chosen to create a FV for the biometric sample. The chosen FE and resulting FV will be transmitted along the network. On the server end, a user has a set of pre-enrolled FVs that are created by the set of disposable FEs. The enrolled FV that was created with the same FE used on the client end will be compared to the FV passed from the client end. In addition, the FE used to create the enrolled FV on the server side will be matched to the FE used on the client side. After the comparison process, the system will select a new disposable FE to be used.
Protocol II is based on empirical evidence that any unique FE will create a unique FV. Therefore, any FE i , which is different from FE j will produce a FV i that is also different from FV j [2] . Unlike Protocol I which requires both the FE and resulting FV used on the client side to be transmitted across the network to be matched, only the FV needs to be transmitted.
III. NEW PROTOCOLS FOR MITIGATING REPLAY ATTACKS
In this section we introduce new protocols, Protocol III and Protocol IV. Much like Protocol II, Protocol III assumes that two different FEs are unique, and the resulting FVs from both FEs are also different. In the case that a FV is unique, we can create a set of FVs that are all unique from one another.
Each FV would differ by the order of histograms within it. As stated in Section II.B, GEFE ML creates FEs with n number of patches. It also determines whether that patch will extract features or not. If a patch is not being extracted from, the features in the histogram for that patch would all be set to zero. This effectively discounts that patch when performing a distance measure between FVs. The variable m represents the number of patches of an evolved FE (for each patch of an FE there is an associated histogram). If a FV consists of m histograms, then there are m! possible permutations of the histograms, thus the set of FVs that can be created has a cardinality of m!. In order for the FVs in the set to be unique, it must be assumed that all histograms within a FV are significantly different from each other.
Protocol IV is similar to Protocol III, with the exception being the total number of histograms in a FV. Whereas FVs from Protocol III had m histograms, FVs created from the Protocol IV will have n histograms. There will be m histograms from activated patches, and a FV will have n -m dummy histograms. A dummy histogram is designed so that the sums of its features are equivalent to the sum of features in an activated histogram and the histogram should not affect the distance measure. The dummy histogram will not affect the Manhattan distance between FVs.
The purpose of our experiments was to measure the uniqueness of different permutations of histograms within FVs. FVs were the result of FEs trained and cross-validated on subjects from the Facial Recognition Grand Challenge (FRGC) dataset [32] . Each subject had three snapshots taken at different times, with the expressions varying slightly between them. We used 105 subjects from the FRGC dataset to build the training set and we used 109 subjects for our validation set. Each set was composed of a probe dataset and a gallery dataset. The probe set is representative of a template being passed into a system, while the gallery set is representative of pre-enrolled templates.
The purpose of performing cross-validation was to create FEs that generalized well to unseen subjects, so we created a test set, composed of 100 subjects from FRGC, that was mutually exclusive to the training and validation sets. We then test the best generalizing FEs on the test set to confirm that they have satisfactory recognition accuracy on unseen images. We also test the Standard LBP Method (SLBPM), on the test set to compare the performance of the SLBPM and GEFE ML .
As stated in Section II.A, FVs are composed of histograms, one from each patch. To test for uniqueness, we measured the similarity between different permutations of histograms in a FV using the Normalized Manhattan Distance (NMD) measure [33] . The NMD formula is shown in Equation 2, where the variables h i and h j represents two histograms being measured, l represents the length of the histograms and z represents the current position in a histogram. (2) In Experiment I, we tested the effectiveness of Protocol III. We measured the NMDs between different permutations of histograms from activated patches of FVs of all images within the probe set of the test set. However, we only considered the activated histograms within FVs within measuring.
Experiment II is similar to Experiment I, with the exception that we tested the effectiveness of Protocol IV. We measured the NMDs between activated histograms as well as dummy histograms in the FV. The dummy histograms for this experiment had every feature but one set to zero, and that one feature would be the sum of features from activated histograms.
Because of the simplistic model of these replicated histograms, we can refer to these as simple noise histograms. For all simple noise histograms in a FV, the position of the feature where the value is the sum of features from activated features is different. This set up will give the maximum NMD between two simple noise histograms. For both experiments, we keep track of collisions between permutations of histograms within FVs. We considered a NMD to indicate a collision if it was less than some threshold γ.
V. RESULTS
We created 60 disposable FEs using the GEFE ML method, with each FE being trained and validated for 2000 evaluations. We used an Estimation of Distribution Algorithm (EDA) [34] as the evolutionary computation, with an elitist value of 1 and a population of 20. We tested both the SLBPM and the 60 on the test set, and the results are displayed in Table I . The column 'Accuracy' is the recognition accuracy of each method on the test set, while '% of Surface Area' is the amount of image area that FEs from GEFE ML and the SLBPM extracted from.
For GEFE ML , the results shown are the average results from the best generalizing FEs of all 60 runs. In terms of accuracy and surface area, an ANOVA test shows a statistical difference between SLBPM and GEFE ML , with a 95% confidence. While the difference in accuracy is slight, the difference in surface area is considerable. A reduced surface area, combined with the masking thresholds for patches, means a reduction in overall features being used. These results suggest that GEFE ML is superior to the SLBPM in terms of recognition accuracy as well as feature reduction. A.
Results of Experiment I
The results of this experiment show that collisions occur at a lower threshold for FVs created by disposable FEs than for FVs created by the SLBPM. This is displayed in Fig. 1 , which shows the percentage of collisions for all activated histograms over an increasing threshold γ. The series 'ActivatedHistos' represents the collisions for activated histograms in FVs created by disposable FEs. The series 'SLBPM' represents the collisions for histograms in FVs created by the SLBPM. As shown in Fig. 1 , collisions of histograms from disposable FEs start to rise around a γ of 0.4. Also shown in Fig. 1 , collisions for the SLBPM do not start to rise until γ is 0.55. Collisions at low thresholds are not desirable because this means that different permutations of histograms for FVs are not unique, and are not as effective in preventing a captured FV from being used maliciously. Though collisions occur earlier for disposable FEs than for the SLBPM, the SLBPM achieves a 100% collision rate earlier than disposable FEs. By a γ of 0.8, 100% of the permutations of histograms collide for disposable FEs. 
B. Results of Experiment II
The results of Experiment II show the collisions of activated and dummy histograms do not occur until high threshold levels. Fig. 2 shows the percentage of collisions for all histograms over an increasing threshold γ. In Fig. 2 , the series 'ActivatedHistos+DummyHistos' represent the collisions for activated histograms in FVs created by disposable FEs. The series 'SLBPM' represents the collisions for histograms in FVs created by the SLBPM. In Fig. 2 , collisions for histograms do not occur until after a γ of 0.8. This is ideal because it shows that permutations of histograms in FVs created by disposable FEs are unique. In addition to the high threshold at which collisions begin to occur, disposable FEs do not achieve 100 collision rates until a γ of 0.98. 
VI. DISCUSSION
The results of Experiment I and Experiment II differ greatly due to the difference in Protocols III and IV. For Experiment I, we only measured the NMD between activated histograms, or histograms from patches that had a masking value greater than 0.5. For Experiment I, there were fewer permutations of histograms for disposable FEs than for the SLBPM. As a result, the percent of collisions increased earlier for disposable FEs. This realization made necessary the usage of simple noise histograms, to show an accurate comparison in Experiment II.
The results of disposable FEs were much better in Experiment II than in Experiment I, however, simple noise histograms would not be applicable in practice. If a FV using simple noise histograms was to be captured, even if all activated and simple noise histograms were swapped around, the attacker would have no problem determining the simple noise histograms.
Despite the fact that histograms appear to be more unique than histograms from disposable FEs, it is important to note that the average recognition accuracy for all disposable FEs are significantly greater than the accuracy for SLBPM. In addition to a higher accuracy, the disposable FEs also have been trained to generalize to unseen subjects, giving it an advantage over the SLBPM method.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
The results suggest that Protocols III and IV can be effectively used to create unique FVs to be used within a disposable FE authentication system. Protocol III creates more unique FVs than protocol II and FEs from GEFE ML have been proven to be more unique than the standard LBP method when using Protocol IV.
However, as discussed in Section VI, simple noise histograms are too simplistic to be practical. Future work will be devoted to creating realistic dummy histograms. Challenges for building realistic histograms will be designing them so that the sum of features is accurate, making sure that there is no pattern that an attacker will be able to lock onto, and to make sure that the dummy histograms will not affect the distance measure between FVs.
